

Ex Ante Financing for Disaster Risk Management and Adaptation

A Public Policy Perspective

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GlobalAgRisk, Inc.



- Mission

- *Improve access to financial services for the rural poor through innovative approaches for transferring weather risk*

- Activities

- Research and development
- Technical capacity building
- Educational outreach

- Supported by

- Multinational donors
- Governments
- Nongovernment organizations

- Select Country Work

- *Peru – El Niño*
- *Mongolia – Livestock*
- *Vietnam –Flood / Drought*
- *India – Drought*
- *Morocco – Drought*
- *Mexico – Drought*
- *Romania – Drought*
- *Ethiopia –Drought*

Economic Impact of Natural Disasters

Muestra de Pérdidas Totales Asociadas a Desastres Naturales

País	Año	Desastre	Pérdida Total/ PIB*	Emergencia/PIB**
Honduras	1998	Huracán	38.4%	6.1%
República Dominicana	1998	Huracán	13.7%	2.2%
Ecuador	1998	Inundación	12.3%	2.0%
México	1985	Terremoto	2.1%	0.3%
Argentina	1985	Inundación	1.5%	0.2%


* Fuente: EM-DAT

** Fuente: estimaciones propias

Fuente: Cardenas, 2009


GDP Growth Rate

One Year Before and in the Year of Natural Disaster



Source: Adapted from Cardenas, 2009

The Shock of the Natural Disaster Has a Longer-Term Effect as Well



Source: World Bank 2002, 2003



Somebody Always Pays for Catastrophic Risk

Who? How?

Society needs to understand the cost of natural disaster risk

Someone always pays:

- The poor pay through direct losses and long term economic impacts
- Financial institutions restrict services as they learn that the correlated losses of many of their borrowers and savers create significant banking problems
- Governments—disaster relief and recovery expenses, infrastructure investments, subsidized agricultural insurance
- Donors forgive debt and divert funds for recovery

Need incentives for proper risk management and mitigation


The Poor Pay

Poverty Traps Created by Severe Events

- Rapid onset shocks can knock households below a minimum asset threshold, locking them into a poverty trap
- Households sell assets to maintain minimum levels of consumption — This in turn reduces future streams of income
- Households reduce consumption to protect assets — This can impact the human capital needed to generate future income streams
- Slow onset shocks can also result in poverty traps depending on the coping strategies available to and chosen by households

Lenders Pay

1997-1998 El Niño Spike and Recovery



With this event every 1 in 15 years, 300 basis points must be added

Governments Pay

- Disaster relief
- Infrastructure repairs
- Debt forgiveness
- Lost revenues
- Hinders economic growth
- Social programs for those thrust into poverty by the disaster
- Opportunity costs of diverted budget resources

Problems with *Ad Hoc* Responses to Natural Disasters

- Responses that are not planned are also not targeted to the proper groups
- Acting without a plan and under political pressure will also mean the response is done with little oversight; increasing the opportunity for corruption
- Working to deploy resources after a disaster without a plan generally involves higher administrative costs
- Putting public money into the sectors without a plan also means that there is a lower economic return from the public expenditure

More Problems with *Ad Hoc* Responses to Natural Disasters


- Ineffective
 - It takes too long to deliver and results in extended waiting periods for disaster victims
- Inequitable
 - The poorest segments of population most affected by disasters generally receive only a small fraction of the assistance
- Insufficient
 - Governments rarely have enough resources to help everyone in need, meaning resources are allocated on first-come-first-served basis

Why Governments Need Risk Management Strategies

- The benefits from catastrophe risk management at the country level, regionally and local can be significant
- Public financing can be improved with catastrophe risk management that uses capital and reinsurance markets
- It is possible to create strategies in the short, medium and long term that will give results in the short run

Risk Management Policy Framework

A Systematic Approach to Risk Management



Step One


Identify Goals and Priorities



- Who are the target beneficiaries?
- What is the intended outcome?
- What are the potential benefits of risk management?
- Identify roles for public and private sector in creating markets to aid in risk management
- Consider how to spur development
- Consider how to keep those on the margin from falling into poverty traps

Step Two


Understand the Risk Profile



- Identify risks that impact livelihoods and assets
- Distinguish between micro- and macro-level risks
- Consider seasonal and geographical variations
- Model the risk with historic data and existing infrastructure to understand how the same event will impact various segments of the population
- Consider current risk-coping strategies

Step Three


Design a Risk Management Strategy



- Plan with careful attention to needs and constraints
- Emphasize *ex ante* approaches that enhance existing risk-coping systems
- Invest in risk mitigation to lessen the impacts
- Clearly delineate public and private roles for risk mitigation, risk financing, and emergency response
- Design risk management solutions that support the financial sector and the market
- Encourage incentives for good management practices
- Decrease opportunities for fraud and abuse

Step Four

Implement the Risk Management Strategy



When implementing the use of market-based risk transfer instruments the following questions must be addressed:

- Who will use the instruments?
- Who will deliver the instruments?
- Who will underwrite the risk — who pays?
- Who will provide the expertise and expense to develop and maintain the instruments?
- Who will pay for education of potential users?
- Who will develop needed laws and regulations?

Advantages of Risk Transfer via Capital and/or Global Reinsurance Markets (Ex Ante *Risk Financing*)

- Financial risk transfer provides access to global capital markets that can absorb the financial exposure of catastrophic events
- Better planning and resilience to economic impact of catastrophe:
Smoothing of budgets
- Faster response to disaster
- More structured rules: reducing corruption
- Better planning for more effective, efficient and equitable responses
- Potentially better targeting
- Improved incentives for risk reduction systems

More on Advantages of *Ex Ante* Financing of Catastrophic Risk

- Financing corresponds to magnitude of loss—opportunity for better allocation of resources
- Ex ante financing can help households, communities, governments mitigate the financial impacts of risk and longer term impacts on development
- Can strengthen rural financial services—removes some of the risk of providing services to vulnerable populations
- Can facilitate disaster planning, risk mitigation, and strategies for adaptation

Public Policy Recommendations for *Ex Ante* Risk Financing

- National/regional budgets should plan for the contingent liabilities associated with natural disasters
- Develop plans and linkages for efficient public expenditures that flow from central government to appropriate public agencies and local and regional governments
- Promote development of insurance markets to transfer catastrophic risk and to develop new financial products
- Have professionals *inside* government who understand risk management from the public and *private* perspective

Types of Risk Financing


- **Reserves / Savings**
 - Covers low severity, high frequency events
 - Viability depends on opportunity cost of capital
- **Contingent credit**
 - Stand-by line of credit drawn down immediately after a pre-defined disaster
 - Annual commitment fee
- **Indemnity-based insurance**
 - Loss specific
 - High deductible/high administrative costs
- **Index-based insurance / Catastrophe Bonds**
 - Payments based on an index (e.g., rainfall level, hurricane intensity, area yield losses)
 - Quick disbursement
 - Lower transaction costs
 - Imperfect coverage (basis risk)

Source: Mahul, 2005

Layering the Risk


Public & Private Sector Roles

Probability of Occurrence



Source: Mahul, 2005

Possible Risk Financing Channels




Adapted from Mahul, 2005

Mexico: Natural Disaster Financing

Mexican government created a natural disaster fund “FONDEN” in 1996 to set aside designated disaster financing

However, contributions to disaster funds can be unreliable



Source: Cardenas, 2006

Mexican Experience with *Ex Ante* Financing of Natural Disaster Risk

2006: Mexican government applied blend of CAT bond and Index Insurance to finance earthquake risk

- The goal is to enhance the capacity of FONDEN, a disaster relief fund, without tying up capital
- Underwritten by Global Reinsurers
- Payments based on earthquake of 8.0 or greater on Richter scale
 - US\$160 million in contingent disaster financing from CAT Bonds in one zone of Mexico
 - US\$290 million in financing from index insurance in 2 other zones of Mexico

Mexico also has a FONDOS program where states (regional governments) purchase drought insurance to fund assistance for small farmers

Comprehensive Approach to Risk Management

Risk Assessment

*Identify risks, vulnerabilities,
strategies*

Capacity Building & Education

*Technical and institutional capacity,
risk education*

Ex Ante Risk Management

*Risk Financing (Insurance, Risk
Transfer), Adaptation,
Disaster Planning, Risk Mitigation*

Ex Post Risk Management

*Coping strategies, disaster relief,
recovery, reconstruction*

Linking Insurance and Risk Adaptation

Combining insurance with adaptation strategies can reduce risk exposure and protect livelihoods against severe events

- Encourage risk management *and* appropriate adaptation
- Smooth cash flow following a disaster
- Targeted, timely payments
- Build on existing network for education and access to reduce cognitive failure and reduce transaction costs
- Stakeholders may use payouts to finance adaptation investments (e.g., infrastructure, livelihoods transitions, etc.)

Insurance is not a solution to climate change

- *Insurance can protect against weather extremes, but adaptation is necessary to adjust to changing climate trends*

Consider the Widespread Effects of El Niño in Piura

- Disruptions in major markets
 - Financial services (about 3 percentage points of interest rates tied to El Niño)
 - Agricultural value chain — fertilizer sales down 27% in 1998
- Damaged infrastructure
 - Transportation sector — accounted for 59% of losses in 1998
 - Poechos Reservoir — capacity was reduced by ½ in last El Niño
- Disruptions in small trade
- Significant declines in exports
- Loss of GDP and tax base of government
- Destruction of homes and other private property
- Significant declines in the anchovy catch
- Disruptions in the livelihoods of smallholder households



Our Work in Peru

ENSO Insurance: a new Catastrophe Insurance Product that is designed to transfer extreme catastrophe risk associated with strong El Niño. Product would provide early payments *before* the onset of the El Niño rainfall and flooding

- Early payments could be used to mitigate losses, encourage adaptation
- Research and feasibility work to identify how advance payments from ENSO insurance can support risk management and mitigation activities for:
 - Government agencies (disaster management & relief)
 - NGOs (household adaptation to climate change)
 - Infrastructure (mitigation measures & repairs)
 - Improve markets (value chain, micro finance, lending to agriculture, products for farmer associations and households exposed to this risk)

Thank You!

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